WHAT IS FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM?


A football firm is an organized gang – mostly supporting a football club – that engage in fights with firms supporting other clubs. The fights mostly take place far away from the football grounds to make it as hard as possible for police and other law enforcement to interrupt. Football firm violence has in many countries replaced the more unorganized violence related to sports, though in the public eye both forms of violence are considered hooliganism.

Clothing

To avoid attracting the attention of police, many UK hooligans began to wear expensive European designer clothing in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Designers popular with UK football firms include Abercrombie & Fitch, Aquascutum, Burberry, Lacoste and many other. A BBC investigation in 2002 suggested that the most popular label of them all back then was Stone Island.

The culture revolving around the clothing style became known as Casual, and the wearers of designer clothing became known as Casuals.



UK football firms

England/Wales

* Arsenal - The Herd, Gooners
* Aston Villa - Villa Youth
* Barnsley F.C - Inner City Tykes/Barnsley 50
* [Birmingham City F.C.|Birmingham City]] - Zulu Warriors
* Bolton Wanderers - Cuckoo Boys
* Bradford City - Ointment
* Braintree Town - The Iron Crunchers
* Brentford - Brentford Casuals
* Brighton & Hove Albion - Headhunters
* Bristol City - CSF (City Service Firm)
* Bristol Rovers - GHS (Gas Hit Squad)
* Burnley - Suicide Squad
* Cardiff City - Soul Crew, Barmy Army
* Chelsea - Headhunters
* Chesterfield - CBS (Chesterfield Bastard Squad)
* Crystal Palace - Dirty Thirty
* Derby County - DLF (Derby Lunatic Fringe)
* Doncaster Rovers - DDR (Donny Defence Regiment)
* Everton - ECM (Everton Charming Men)
* Grimsby Town - CBP (Cleethorpes Beach Patrol)
* Hartlepool United - Blue Order
* Hull City - City Psychos, Hull City Service(HCS)
* Leeds United - Service Crew
* Leicester City - Baby Squad
* Lincoln City - LTE (Lincoln Transit Elite)
* Liverpool - Urchins
* Luton Town - MIGS
* Manchester City - City Guvnors
* Manchester United - MIB (Men In Black)
* Middlesbrough - Boro Frontline
* Millwall - Bushwackers, The Treatment
* Newcastle United - Gremlins, The Bender Crew
* Northampton Town - NAT (Northampton Affray Team)
* Nottingham Forest - Red Dogs, Naughty Forties, Trent End Boot Boys, Forest Executive Crew (FEC)
* Oldham Athletic - FYC (Fine Young Casuals)
* Oxford United - SMHS (South Midland Hit Squad)
* Peterborough United - Blue Division

* Plymouth Argyle - TCE(The Central Element)
* Port Vale - VLF (Vale Lunatic Fringe)
* Portsmouth - 6:57 Crew
* Preston North End - Paras
* Queens Park Rangers - C-Mob
* Reading - Reading Casual Firm
* Sheffield United - BBC (Blades Business Crew)
* Sheffield Wednesday - OCS (Owls Crime Squad)
* Shrewsbury Town - EBF (English Border Front), Shrewsbury Youth
* Slough Town - Rebel Chavs United
* Southampton - The Uglies
* Southend United - CS Crew
* Stockport County - EVF (Edgeley Volunteer Force)
* Stoke City - Naughty Forty
* Sunderland - Seaburn Casuals, HCC (Hylton Castle Crew)
* Swansea City - Jacks
* Tottenham Hotspur - N17s, Yiddos
* Tranmere Rovers - Stanley Boys
* West Bromwich Albion - Section Five
* West Ham United - Hammers, ICF (Inter City Firm)
* Wigan Athletic - Goon Squad
* Wolverhampton Wanderers - Subway Army
* Wrexham - Frontline
* York City - York Nomads Society


Scotland

* Aberdeen - ASC (Aberdeen Soccer Casuals)
* Airdrie Utd - Section B (inherited from the village's former club Airdrieonians)
* Celtic - CSC (Celtic Soccer Casuals)
* Dundee - DUC (Dundee Utility Crew)
* Falkirk - Falkirk Fear
* Hearts - CSF (Casual Soccer Firm)
* Hibs - CCS (Capital City Service)
* Motherwell - SS (Saturday Service)
* Morton - M.S.C. (Morton Soccer Crew)
* Partick Thistle - NGE (North Glasgow Express)
* Raith Rovers - K.S.C (Kirkcaldy Soccer Casuals)
* Rangers - ICFG (Inter-City Firm)
* St Mirren - LSD (Love Street Division)



German football firms

* Alemannia Aachen - Asoziale Randgruppe
* Arminia Bielefeld - Ostwestfalenterror
* Bayer Leverkusen - Mad Boyz, Young Boys
* Bayern Munich - Service Crew
* Borussia Dortmund - BorussenFront
* Borussia Mönchengladbach - Sturmtruppen, Alte Borussen
* MSV Duisburg - Forever DU
* BFC Dynamo - Koma Kolonne
* Eintracht Braunschweig - Alten Kameraden
* Eintracht Frankfurt - Adlerfront, Brigade Nassau
* Fortuna Düsseldorf - First Class Fighters
* Hamburger SV - HH Ultras
* Hannover 96 - HauerClub Ohne Ende

* Hertha BSC Berlin - Hertha Frosche, Endsieg
* Karlsruher SC - Destroyers, BadenKorps
* Kickers Offenbach - Anti-Sozial-Front
* 1. FC Köln - Streetfighters, Ultras CCCA, Northside Boys
* FSV Mainz 05 - MZ-Army
* 1860 München - Chaoten
* 1. FC Nürnberg - Red Devils
* FC Rot-Weiß Erfurt - EF-Parolis
* Rot-Weiß Essen - Essener Löwen
* Schalke 04 - Gelsenszene, ULTRAS GELSENKIRCHEN
* VfB Stuttgart - Commando Cannstatt
* SV Waldhof Mannheim - City Boys, Kurpfalzfront
* Werder Bremen - Mad Crew, CityBoys

Other football firms

Various teams from former Yugoslavia have strong and organized hooligan elements amongst its factions of fans. Many Greek and Turkish teams have also powerful elements of hooliganism amongst its fans. Polish hooligans (called szalikowcy, pseudokibice, or kibole) are likewise very strong. In Spanish-speaking countries hooligans are known as barras bravas ("wild gangs"), and they are particularly strong in South America and Mexico.

Argentina

* Boca Juniors - La 12
* River Plate - Los borrachos del tablón


Belgium

* R.S.C. Anderlecht - Brussels Casuals Service
* Standard Ličge - Hell-Side, WCF (Wallon's Casual Firm)

FC Bruges - Bruges Casual Firm

Bosnia and Herzegovina

* FK Zeljeznicar - The Maniacs
* FK Sarajevo - Horde Zla
* FK Radnik - Incident


Chile

* Colo Colo - Garra Blanca
* Universidad de Chile - Los de Abajo


Croatia

* Dinamo - Bad Blue Boys
* Hajduk - Torcida
* Rijeka - Armada
* Osijek - Kohorta
* Cibalia Vinkovci - Ultras


Denmark

* Brřndby IF - South Side United, Suburban Casuals
* FC Křbenhavn - Copenhagen Casuals
* Odense BK - Odense Fight Club
* Aarhus GF - Ultras White Pride
* Aalborg Boldspilklub - Boys Republic Ultras Aalborg


The Netherlands

* Ajax Amsterdam - F-Side, AFCA Youth
* Feyenoord Rotterdam - SCF, FIIIR
* FC Utrecht - Bunnik Side, FCU Youth, UHF
* ADO Den Haag - North Side
* PSV - Oostfront
* FC Groningen - Z-Side
* NEC Nijmegen - HKN (HazenKamp Nijmegen)
* Vitesse Arnhem - Rijnfront Arnhem
* Fortuna Sittard - Vak N
* Sparta Rotterdam - Castle Maniacs
* FC Omniworld - OmniArmy
* FC Den Bosch - M-Side, Young Vandals


Poland

* Legia Warsaw - Teddy Boys, Turysci'97
* Wisla Cracow - Sharks, Devils, Wisl@cy 01
* Cracovia - Jude Gang, Lowcy Psow (Dog Catchers), Anty-Wisla
* Lechia Gdansk - Green Animals, Chuligani Wolnego Miasta
* Widzew Lodz - DHW, Destroyers
* Ruch Chorzow - Psychofans
* LKS Lódz - Galera Warriors, Crazy Cannibals


Russia

* CSKA Moscow - Red-Blue Warriors, Kids
* Dynamo Moscow - Blue-White Dynamite, Patriots
* Lokomotiv Moscow - Ultra Loko, Vikings
* Spartak Moscow - Flint's Crew, Gladiators, Mad Butchers, Clockwork Oranges
* Torpedo Moscow - West 5 Action Group, Supporters Group, Troublemakers
* Zenit Saint Petersburg - Jolly Nevsky, Coalition, Crazy Fans, Nevsky Front


Serbia and Montenegro

* Partizan - Juzni front, GROBARI 1970, Grobari Srbija, Young Boys, Acatraz
* Red Star - Delije Sever, Belgrade Boys, Ultras, Heroes, Ultra Boys, Brigate
* Rad - Nucleo, Gvozdeni odred, 101%
* Zemun - Taurunum Boys, Boys '95
* Vojvodina - Red Firm, Firma, Stara Garda


Sweden

* AIK - FB (Firman Boys), YB (Young Boys), BB (Baby Boys), YYY (Yngre Yngre Yngre)
* Djurgĺrdens IF - DFG (Djurgĺrdens Fina Grabbar), DYG (Djurgĺrdens Yngre Grabbar), DMG (Djurgĺrdens Mindre Grabbar)
* GAIS - GM (Gärningsmännen), GY (GAIS Yngre)
* IFK Göteborg - WM (Wisemen), GYD (Gothenburg Youth Division), YCG (Youth Crew Gothenburg)
* Hammarby IF - KGB (Kompisgänget Bajen), BBS (Bajen Baby Squad)
* Helsingborgs IF - FL (Frontline), HBGY (HBG Yngre)
* Kalmar FF - KF (Kalmarfamiljen)
* Malmö FF - SBC (Sky Blue Crew)
* Västerĺs SK - VC (VSK Casuals), VYC (VSK Youth Casuals)
* Örebro SK - ÖB (Örebroderskapet)
* Linköpings HC (Hockey) - CC (Cluben Casuals)



Relations with extreme political groups

Football firms, especially southern and eastern European firms, are often linked with extreme right political groups. The firms of the following teams are well-known for their relations with extreme right political groups: Chelsea (Headhunters) (although chelsea's most famous hooligan 'One-Armed Babs' was mixed-race), Oldham Athletic (Fine Young Casuals), Real Madrid (Ultra Sur), Lazio Roma (Curva Sud), Ferencvaros and Berlin club BFC Dynamo (Koma Kolonne).

Other firms are known for their multicultural make-up, like the firms of Arsenal (Gooners), Tottenham Hotspur (N17s, Yidd0s), West Ham United (Inter City Firm), Ajax Amsterdam (F-Side) and Feyenoord Rotterdam (SCF). In the past there have been some occasions where Feyenoord supporters have shown up at demonstrations and get togethers of Neo Nazi groups to invoke clashes. In Minsk, Belarus, one of the popular footbal teams, FC MTZ-RIPO, draws its support from antifa groups.

Introduction

The United Kingdom is perceived by virtually all observers in Europe, and by football fans themselves, as having had the earliest and most most severe problems with football hooliganism. Certainly, it is the only nation to have received a blanket expulsion from all European Football competitions – a ban that was initially made for an indefinite period following the Heysel Stadium tragedy in which 39 Juventus fans died when a wall collapsed after clashes with Liverpool supporters.

It is perhaps because of this unenviable record that the United Kingdom has taken the lead in the development of control measures to deal with hooliganism. These measures are closely examined in the first part of this chapter, where we trace the various strategies adopted by the British police, as well as the legislative responses of the British government. As we shall see, the various strategies and responses have been primarily reactive and, increasingly, have been influenced (if not entirely led) by technological developments, such as the use of closed-circuit television and computer databases.

Such advances have certainly helped the flourishing collaboration between the member states of Europe in tackling hooliganism. The European Parliament, however, has become increasingly concerned about the use of such technology, particularly in relation to the issue of the free movement of individuals across member state boundaries.

Finally, the chapter focuses on some of the more proactive responses to football hooliganism. In particular, we look at the phenomenon of the 'fan projects', which originated in Germany in the seventies and which have been swiftly imitated by many other countries in Europe, including Belgium and The Netherlands.

Policing football hooliganism

The principal difficulty for the police in dealing with football hooliganism has been in differentiating between the hooligan and the ordinary football supporter. This difficulty led to the police developing a system whereby all fans were contained, both inside the ground and in travelling to the ground. At the same time, the second primary strategy of the police was the undercover operation: an attempt to ascertain who exactly the hooligans were.

The undercover operation

The English Football Association recommended that plain clothes officers be used in the domestic game as far back as the mid-sixties and requests for the police to infiltrate travelling supporters with plain clothes officers were also made by the Football Association in 1981. The belief of the police (torridly supported by the media) by the 1980s was that football hooligans had transformed themselves from an ill-organised mob into highly-organised forces with a complex network of hierarchies1

Officers were given new identities and instructed to live the life of a hooligan and mingle with other hooligans. These tactics resulted in the launch of numerous early morning raids on the homes of suspected football hooligans from around March 1986. Armstrong and Hobbs detail a familiar pattern in the arrest and charging of suspects in these raids.

Hooligan gangs

The suspects would generally be part of an organised gang that had apparently caused mayhem throughout the country; they would have a 'calling-card' which would normally be displayed on or left beside their victim; they would have used an array of weaponry (which the police nearly always displayed to the media in the post-arrest briefing) and they would often possess incriminating literature (although on one occasion, this included a copy of an academic book on football hooligans entitled Hooligans Abroad).

Charges and convictions

On most occasions, individuals arrested in these raids were charged with conspiracy to cause affray or conspiracy to commit violence, with what they had said to the police and what the police had found in their homes being used as the primary evidence against them.

Many of the raids resulted in high-profile trials and convictions. (e.g. The eighteen-week trial of four Chelsea fans which cost over £2 million and resulted in sentences including one of ten years). But many also failed in sometimes dramatic circumstances, with the reliability of evidence being intensely disputed and the behaviour of undercover officers severely condemned2

Containment and escort

A common sight in the seventies (and for much of the eighties) was that of the police escorting visiting supporters from railway and coach stations to and from the ground. Fans were literally surrounded by police, some on horseback and others with police dogs. In contrast, the nineties has seen the use of the less confrontational tactic of posting officers at specified points en route to the ground.

This is, perhaps, more to do with the recent circumstances of away fans than with the police entirely changing their tactics. It has certainly been the case that travelling away support has dwindled, to the extent that the familiar en masse arrival of football fans at British Rail stations around the country on a Saturday lunchtime is, perhaps, a sight of the past.

Police criticism

The police, however, have still been heavily criticised in some quarters for an over-zealous approach in dealing with travelling supporters 3 , such as conducting unnecessary searches of coaches for alcohol and even searching supporters' belongings in their absence, though in a recent fan survey, only 20.7% of supporters disagreed with the use of police escorts4, stressing their use as effective protection for away fans.

Inside the ground

The visiting (or 'away') fans were invariably herded into grounds via separate turnstiles and into areas where they were segregated from the home support. These isolationist operations were often eemphasised by a line of police officers separating the home and away fans in a sort of "no man's land" and by the high metal fences which surrounded these fan pens, an attempt to prevent fans from spilling onto the football pitch itself. 5

The police have also been commonly used at the turnstile. Traditionally, this has been a law-enforcement role, with the emphasis on preventing illegal entry into the ground, enforcing exclusion orders and searching supporters for weapons and other prohibited articles.

But they have also been used by clubs to enforce club policy and ground regulations, such as enforcing club bans and membership schemes and deterring fraud by turnstile operators 6. More recently, the role of the Steward has come to the fore at football grounds, which has partly relieved the responsibilities of the police in this area.

Police tactics at grounds

While the use of en masse containment alongside covert detective operations has been the basic pattern of policing football hooliganism, police tactics can vary considerably at individual football grounds, as indeed they do on other matters. Such tactics can depend on various factors including the prospective size of the crowd, the relative profile of the particular match, the reputation of the supporters involved and the priorities of the local force involved.7

The inconsistencies between different police forces in their approach to dealing with football supporters was highlighted in The Home Office Affairs Committee report, Policing Football Hooliganism (1991) which recognised that:

" … different police forces and, within police forces, the different police Commanders were inconsistent. A variety of witnesses complained of these inconsistencies. The FSA [Football Supporters Association] told us that 'acceptable behaviour at one ground could be an arrestable offence at another' … [and] different Ground Commanders had different approaches to policing the same ground".

The decline of the 'away' fan

In the Premier league in particular, demand for tickets has risen considerably while ground capacities have declined across the board due to the introduction of all-seater stadia. The expanding interest in football has also led to an increasing commercial interest in the game and, subsequently, an increase in corporate facilities to the detriment of the traditional fan. For example, 14,000 corporate guests were present at the England versus Scotland match during the Euro '96 championships8.

Thus, there is now less room for the away fans than ever before, with clubs obviously favouring their own home support above that of away fans. Six out of ten of the national sample of FA Premier League fans said that they would travel to more games if more tickets were made available to them.

It could be suggested that policing at football grounds has been made easier by the decline of away support. However, the past tendency of fans towards en masse travelling when away from home has been replaced by a proclivity towards independent travel, which is, perhaps, more difficult to police. Group travel still occurs and the police regularly escort away fans in coaches, via specified rendezvous points. Indeed, the Traffic Commissioner has outlined specific guidelines to the police on dealing with the travel arrangements of fans, such as recommending that coaches should arrive at the ground no more than two hours before the designated kick-off time.

The Steward

The nineties has also seen a shift away from using police to control fans inside the ground, with clubs relying more and more on Stewards, employed by the clubs themselves. This is certainly the principal reason why the ratio of police to fans has declined from 1:74 in 1985 to 1:132 in 1992 10. Indeed, Scarborough Football Club played most of their home games without a single police officer inside the ground. Other, more high-profile clubs, such as Aston Villa, Chelsea and Leicester City are increasingly relying on Stewards to police the stadium.

Police officers can only eject individuals from grounds if they are breaking the law, whereas Stewards can follow a particular club's agenda and eject people for breaking club and ground rules. The Home Office report on policing football (1993) recommends that the police leave the task of ejecting supporters to the Stewards. But the ability of Stewards to deal with disorder inside grounds has been severely questioned, not least by the Channel Four programme Dispatches in October 1994. There is also evidence suggesting the disposition of Stewards towards the home fans and

"… on rare occasions stewards have provocatively celebrated home goals in front of the away fans and even attacked them" 11

Training of Stewards

There is no national standard for the training of Stewards in crowd control and spectator safety or, indeed, any legislative requirement that clubs should provide such training for Stewards. The Taylor Report12 highlighted the lack of training for Stewards and Garland and Rowe further suggest that Stewards do not have the traditional authority that the police possess.

"As crowd safety is increasingly handed over to football club Safety Officers, these [Police] skills will need to be passed on to avert future tragedies … where the responsibility for public safety is handed over to Stewards, the police should ensure that adequate training and briefing has taken place."

Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) and hand-held cameras

CCTV was introduced into football grounds around the middle of the 1980s and is now present in almost every Premier and football league ground. The effectiveness of such camera surveillance has also been improved by the introduction of all-seater stadia across the country. 13 Certainly, the results of fan surveys suggest that the introduction of CCTV is, for the most part, welcomed by supporters. Indeed, the Home Office report (1993) states that

"…football supporters are probably more accustomed to being subjected to camera surveillance than most other groups in society."

Another technological feature of police tactics at football grounds is the use of hand-held video cameras, with police filming supporters, primarily in a bid to deter violence, gather intelligence and monitor the efficacy of crowd control.

The Photophone

A further technological advance was the 'photophone' system that allowed the police to exchange photographs of football hooligans from CCTV and other sources via telephone and computer links, allowing vital information to be readily available to the police on matchdays.

The Hoolivan

Advances in technology have also aided the police in both overt and covert surveillance operations. The Hoolivan was launched at the beginning of the season that followed the plethora of incidents in the spring of 1985. This hi-tech item of machinery enabled police to maintain radio contact with all officers inside and outside the ground and to be linked with the CCTV cameras in and around the stadium.

The Hoolivan tended to be used at high-profile matches or when the police were concerned about a particular set of supporters. During Euro '96, Greater Manchester police used a Hoolivan known as the 'skyhawk', which contained nine hydraulic cameras, each of which could be raised up to thirty feet in height.

1985: Bradford & Heysel

The events of the spring of 1985 proved to be a watershed, both for the image of English soccer as well as for governmental and police responses to football violence. At Bradford, 56 people were killed by a fire in the ground. Serious disorder occurred at the grounds of Birmingham City, Chelsea and Luton Town and, most significantly, Liverpool fans were seriously implicated in the deaths of 39 Italian fans prior to the European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus at The Heysel Stadium in Brussels.

The Football Spectators Act (1989)

The Bradford fire and the subsequent report by Justice Popplewell in 1986 raised awareness of the vital issue of spectator safety at football grounds and, in particular, re-introduced the issue of identity cards for football fans. (Though in his final report, he recommended that membership schemes should not be made compulsory.) But it was not until four years later, in 1989, that the government responded to the disorderly incidents of 1985 with the introduction of the Football Spectators Act.

The Football Licensing Authority

The Football Licensing Authority (FLA) was also established under the Football Spectators Act and it is responsible for awarding licences to premises that admit spectators to watch football matches. Though receiving its funding from central government, it retains an independent function and has considerable powers. Not least, it has the capacity to close a stadium.

Identity card and membership schemes

The main proposals of the Act concerned the introduction of compulsory identity cards for spectators at every league, cup and international match played in England and Wales. Throughout the sixties and seventies, various clubs had experimented with their own membership schemes in an attempt to prevent 'unwanted' fans from entering their grounds.

The government and, in particular, the Prime Minister of the time, Margaret Thatcher, strenuously backed the use of identity cards and reciprocal membership schemes as the most effective way of enforcing exclusion orders at football grounds.

Indeed, even before the Football Spectators Act (1989) had been finalised, the Football League had agreed with the government to introduce membership schemes at all clubs, though clubs were slow to implement the recommendations, with only thirteen League clubs (out of ninety two) actually satisfying government requirements by the initial deadline date of August 198716. A survey of police views on membership schemes revealed that 40% did not favour them. In the event, legislation imposing compulsory identity cards was shelved in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, when Justice Taylor condemned such schemes in his final report.

The Taylor report

On the 15th April 1989, ninety-five Liverpool fans were crushed to death on the terraces at the Hillsborough Stadium during the F.A. Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. The subsequent report by Lord Justice Taylor was the ninth such inquiry into crowd safety and control at football matches in the United Kingdom.

Prior to the Hillsborough disaster, the techniques used in crowd control had become virtually synonymous with the control of football hooliganism, with the segregation of supporters, high perimeter fencing and a high-profile presence being among the primary tactics of the police and the clubs.

The interim report

The interim report from Lord Taylor was published relatively swiftly after the tragedy, in August 1989. It contained forty-three separate recommendations which were designed to be immediately implemented by all football league clubs (N. B. the Premier League had yet to be formed) by the beginning of the forthcoming season, 1989/90.

The principal recommendations of the interim report were:

A review of the terrace capacities in all grounds, with an immediate 15% reduction in ground capacities

Restrictions on the capacities of self-contained supporter pens

The opening of perimeter fence gates

A review of the Safety Certificates held by all Football League grounds

The creation of locally-based, multi-agency groups to advise on ground safety

Constant monitoring of crowd density by the police and Stewards

The final report

The final report was published in January 1990 and included praise from Lord Taylor regarding the response of clubs to the recommendations contained within the Interim report. The report emphasised the lack of communication between the fans and the football authorities, criticising, in particular, the lack of facilities for supporters at football grounds and the poor condition of football grounds. In total, the final report contained seventy-six recommendations, of which the main ones were:

The conversion of all football league grounds to all-seater stadia by the end of the millennium

The removal of spikes from perimeter fencing, which should be no more than 2.2 metres in height

Ticket-touting to become a criminal offence

The introduction of new laws to deal with offences inside football stadia, including racial abuse

All-seater stadia


The insistence of the report that football grounds become all-seater placed an unprecedented financial burden on even the richest football clubs in the football League. There were certainly severe critics of such a recommendation and censures were not only made on purely financial grounds. Simon Inglis18 argued that terraced grounds exist throughout the world and do not cause problems and that tragedies such as Hillsborough are more judiciously explained by an examination of the behaviour and control of spectators. In a survey of members of the Football Supporters' Association19 the majority of those surveyed were opposed to all-seater grounds. Lord Taylor admitted in the report that:

"There is no panacea which will achieve total safety and cure all problems of behaviour and crowd control. But I am satisfied that seating does more to achieve those objectives than any other measure."20

In March 1990, the government announced a cut in the rate of tax levied on the Football Pools, which meant that approximately £100 million (over a five-year period) would now be allocated towards ground redevelopment. In addition, the Football Trust announced (in October of the same year) that it would distribute £40 million over the same period and by the following January, the Trust had already allocated approximately £7 million towards various ground improvement projects. Pronouncements by both UEFA and FIFA at this time also indicated their unreserved support for all-seater stadia, with both organisations declaring their intention that all major football matches under their auspices would be played at all-seater grounds.

European cooperation

It is really only after 1985 (after the Heysel Stadium tragedy) that a concerted effort has been made to establish cross-border cooperation in Europe between both police forces and football authorities to combat football hooliganism.

The impact of the Heysel Stadium tragedy (where 39 Italian supporters were killed at the European Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool) was such that three major European bodies addressed the issue of football violence. Firstly, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Spectator Violence and misbehaviour at Sports Events, which proposed that measures should be taken to prevent and punish violent behaviour in sport. Secondly, the European Council called on all member countries to deal with violence in and around sports stadia and, finally, The European Parliament proposed a number of different measures to combat football hooliganism.

As recently as April 22nd 1996, the European Union issued guidelines on dealing with football hooliganism, many of which adopted United Kingdom proposals. These guidelines include using the EPI-centre system (secure E-mail) to enable the swift exchange of police intelligence information, the seizure of racist material intended for distribution abroad and the training of club stewards in crowd safety and control techniques. It was also proposed that police forces participate in member states' relevant training courses to aid the exchange of information about the techniques that can be used to prevent hooliganism.

The Claudia Roth report and The European Parliament

While Europe has been quick to adopt many strategies on hooliganism formulated in the United Kingdom, the European Parliament remain especially concerned about restrictions placed on the free movement of football supporters. The Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs commissioned a report on football hooliganism, which was drafted by the MEP, Claudia Roth and adopted by the European Parliament.

The report contained some criticism of police databases and the new information exchange networks, stressing that such networks had led to the arrest and expulsion of innocent people. In the United Kingdom, this was certainly viewed as an attack on the work of the National Criminal Intelligence Service Football Unit, in particular. Any information thus exchanged between member states

"… must be carried out in compliance with the criteria laid down by the Council of Europe for the protection of data of a personal nature"

The report, however, supported the British Home Secretary's demands for increased cooperation between member states regarding the control of cross-border hooliganism. But it further stressed that nationality alone cannot be a basis on which to prevent access to sports stadia and that

"… only after a supporter has been convicted of an offence either of violence or an offence connected with football, can he/she legitimately be prevented from attending matches at home or abroad"

The report concludes by refuting the argument that restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of football supporters is either a viable or a suitable means of controlling football hooliganism.

Police and technology:
Euro '96

The recent European Championships held in England in June, highlighted both the expanding level of cooperation between European police forces since Heysel and the increased sophistication of safety and security techniques that have developed to deal with the football hooligan.

National Crime Intelligence Service Football Unit

The security campaign for Euro '96 was organised by the National Crime Intelligence Service Football Unit. The NCIS Football Unit became fully operational in 1990 and consists of six full-time police officers led by a superintendent. By 1992, over six thousand names and photographs of individuals were held on computer files. Indeed, the information gathered by the Football Unit formed the basis of much of the evidence presented in the Home Affairs Committee reports (1990 and 1991).

The head of the Football Unit (Assistant Chief Constable Malcolm George seconded from the Greater Manchester police) was also in overall control of the police operation for Euro '96. The Football Unit worked in conjunction with an ACPO (Association of Chief police Officers) steering group and a multi-agency working party. Pre-tournament estimates suggested over 10,000 police Officers from nearly a dozen different police forces were involved in policing Euro '96, at a cost of approximately £25 million. The Football Trust provided 75% of the funding required to update police technology for the tournament.

Police National Coordinating Centre

A police coordination centre was based at Scotland Yard in London for the duration of the competition and included police representatives from each of the sixteen countries taking part. In addition to this, a police Liaison Officer travelled with each team and with each national football association throughout their stay in the competition. In addition, four principal sub-groups were in operation throughout the competition.

Match Commander Group

The Match Commander Group comprised the head of policing at each of the eight Euro '96 venues. The purpose of this group was to engender "a common police philosophy" between the different police Commanders.

Senior Investigating Officers Group

Teams of police officers were also assigned to deal with other crimes as well as football hooliganism. The Senior Investigating Officers Group was instigated to enable information to be exchanged on outbreaks of crimes such as shop-theft and pick-pocketing.

IT Group

The Information Technology Group was responsible for maintaining the various computer links between the National Coordinating Centre and the Match Commanders at the eight venues. Essentially, all the police forces in the United Kingdom were included in the computer link-up, enabling the movement of fans between venues to be monitored at all times through the exchange of information between the forces.

Press and Media Group

The task of the Press and Media Group was to avoid sensationalist reporting of any hooligan incidents by encouraging openness between the various police forces and the media. A more salient initiative of the group included issuing detailed advice packs to visiting supporters in four different languages.

EPI-Centre system and Photophone

Each of the eight venues in Euro '96 housed a police Command Centre, complete with Intelligence coordinator. Intelligence could be passed between each of these centres via the EPI-Centre system. The EPI-centre system is an electronic mail system developed by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch that enables large amounts of data to be transferred electronically at speed, and in a secure fashion. Ten 'photophones' were also provided. One for each of the Euro '96 venues and one each for the coordination centre at New Scotland Yard and The British Transport police.

Hooligan Hotline

A 'hooligan hotline' number was also established whereby supporters could phone in and report incidents of hooliganism and perhaps even identify perpetrators. Although this scheme was promoted as being entirely new, similar schemes have been in existence since 1988, when the West Midlands police set up a 24-hour hotline.

An identical scheme was launched in 1990 before the World Cup Finals (even though these were taking place outside the United Kingdom, in Italy) in an attempt to deter disorder by English fans and, again, a purely domestic hotline was established at the beginning of the 1992/93 domestic season in August 1992. Two Premiership clubs (Manchester United and Leeds United) also have telephone hotlines for people to ring in with information on hooligans.

Spotters

The 'Spotter' system was also in operation at each venue. This is a system which is used throughout the season in the English Premier and Football Leagues, where a police liaison officer is attached to a particular club and has the responsibility of identifying and monitoring hooligans, usually travelling to away games and assisting the local force with the detection of hooligans.

During Euro '96, this system was a primary example of cooperation between police from different European countries, with officers from each of the visiting countries providing spotters to work alongside the home country officers at the relevant stadia. (At a previous European championship in Germany in 1988, the British police sent spotters to aid their German counterparts in the detection of English hooligans).

The European Fan projects

While the United Kingdom has certainly taken the lead in the development of highly sophisticated techniques to prevent and monitor football hooligans, an enlightening movement from Europe has been the evolution of the 'Fan projects'.

Germany

Germany were the first to introduce the fan projects, which began in Bremen in 1981, though detached youth workers in Munich had previously worked with football fans back in 1970. The projects were an attempt to take preventative measures against football hooliganism by detailing youth or social workers to work among football supporters.

The project workers established a link between football supporters and the football and police authorities, creating lines of communication that had previously not existed. Critics suggested that the project workers were simply informers working at the behest of the authorities, discovering information about hooligans and what plans they might have for particular matches.

The primary function of the fan projects is to turn supporters away from hooliganism "by means of concrete street-work activities … to help the adolescent fan find his personal identity and to show various possibilities of coping with life".

Löffelholz, Homann and Schwart22 detail a complex network of activities undertaken by the fan workers (alternatively known as "fan coaches"), including individual guidance to fans, intervention in critical situations (e.g. when arrested), educational and careers advice and recreational activities, such as organising travel to matches and producing fan magazines.

There are currently over twenty five fan projects in Germany. Each individual fan project is based around a particular club, from the highest echelons of the Bundesliga, through to the German Second Division and even the amateur football leagues, which attract a extremely high following in Germany.

Funding is mainly drawn from the individual clubs, who themselves obtain funds from a pool organised and funded by Deutscher Fussball Bund (the German equivalent of the Football Association). Finance is also available to projects from the local authorities and from 'social sponsorship' (as opposed to commercial sponsorship).

Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Fan-Projekte and Koodinationstelle Fanprojekte

The Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Fan-Projekte (Federal Study Group of Fan Projects) was formed in May 1989 and represents the fan projects on a national and international level. The group were responsible for fan project activities at the World Cup in Italy in 1990 and in the European championship finals in Sweden. The organisation of the projects was further cemented by the formation of the Koodinationstelle Fanprojekte (Federal Department Coordinating Fan-Projects) in August 1993, who coordinate the expanding network of projects and their various initiatives throughout Germany.

Euro '96

Eight representatives from the Koodinationstelle Fanprojekte were at the recent Euro '96 championships and were available at the Football Supporters' Association fan embassy in Manchester where the German team was based for the majority of the tournament. The German Euro '96 project printed eight thousand fan guides which provided a variety of information including arrangements for accommodation, entertainment and ticket allocations. The project workers were a vital link between the Euro '96 organisers and German fans, as well as between Deutscher Fussball Bund and the supporters.

The Netherlands

Similar (if not identical) fan projects are also functioning in The Netherlands. Learning from the German model, the Dutch fan projects began in 1986 following government-sponsored research on football hooliganism that indicated a need for a preventative approach to the problem.

Initially, the projects were financed by a three-year government grant, which was extended for a further five years to 1994. Since then, the financing for the projects has come under the auspices of individual clubs and city councils, who are responsible for the payment of the youth workers. Funding is also available from Koninklijke Nederlandsche Voetbalbond (the national football association), particularly for the projects organised around international matches and tournaments. (e.g. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Voetralbond funded project workers at Euro '96, who spent two weeks in England prior to the tournament on a reconnaissance mission on behalf of the KNAVE).

The emphasis within the Dutch fan projects is very much on a multi-agency approach, with project coordinators constantly liaising with the police, Football Clubs, local authorities and the various supporters' organisations. At present there are eight major projects in existence and, like the German model, they are based around particular football clubs such as Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV Eindhoven and Utrecht.

As in Germany, the project workers (commonly known as fan coaches) attempt a similar sociopedagogical guidance to fans, helping them to obtain employment or places on educational courses. They also provide purely pragmatic advice, such as details of travel and ticket arrangements for games. However, the project workers also admit to relaying information to the police on the strategy of hooligans for particular matches.

Belgium

The Belgian fan projects officially began only three years ago in 1993, although some fan coaches have been sporadically working with football supporters since 1989. As with the German and Dutch examples, the Belgian project workers are qualified social and youth workers. François Goffe, one of the coordinators of the Belgian fan coaches commented:

"Our fan coaches are certainly not to be compared with the stewards prevalent in the English game. We work purely as social workers and we work with the fans every day of the week, not just on the day of a particular football match" (fieldwork interview).

In contrast to the German and Dutch models, however, the Belgian projects receive no financial help from Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de FA (the Belgian Football Association) or any of the football clubs. Neither do they receive monetary assistance from local authorities. Instead, financial assistance is obtained from central government funds only.

Eight fan coaching projects are currently in existence in Belgium and they liaise closely with the football clubs, police and the Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de FA on various matters, including security arrangements and ticket allocation. Because they do not receive any financial backing from these organisations, they remain independent and are often openly critical of individual clubs, the police and the football authorities.

Sweden

A number of other countries are following the lead from Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands by introducing similar fan projects or fan coaching. These include Switzerland and Sweden, where the Project Battre Lakter Kulture ('Project for a better culture') work alongside the Swedish Football Association in running a variety of anti-hooligan initiatives. As with German and Dutch models, the Swedish fan projects are based at football league clubs such as AIK Stockholm and Hammerbee FC.

New directions in tackling football hooliganism

This brief overview of approaches to tackling football violence reveals a distinct gulf between that of the British philosophy and the line taken in other European countries. While the German, Belgian and Dutch authorities, in particular, have engaged in proactive initiatives to reduce the problems, the British continue, in the main, to employ purely reactive strategies involving more intensive policing of football fans, sophisticated surveillance and intelligence measures and new legislation.

This reactive approach is also the line taken to some extent by the Italian authorities, and the police presence at certain games in their country can be intimidating in the extreme, with water cannon, tear gas and automatic weapons often in evidence. The recent Decreto Maroni, 1994, which followed the fatal stabbing of a Genoa fan, also introduced further restictions on the movement of football fans and controls on their behaviour in the stadiums:

"The chief constable (questore) of the province in which the sporting events take place, can forbid people, who have been reported to the police for or convicted of taking part in violent incidents during or because of sporting events, or to people who in the same event have encouraged violence in such with symbols or posters/banners, access to places where sporting events are taking places, and can oblige the same people to report to the police during the days and hours in which the sporting events are taking place ... The person who infringes the above regulations will be punished with a minimum jail sentence of three months and a maximum of eighteen months. People who have ignored a caution can be arrested in flagrante."

While the British and the Italian authorities favour the increased use of penal approaches, the trend must be towards tackling football violence at its roots. Despite the clear limitations of the fan coaching schemes being developed in the European mainland, they do provide a basis for a more satisfactory treatment of the problems than has existed since the late 1960s in Britain and from the early 1980s in many other countries. The German football clubs have also been much more willing to support and assist such schemes than their English and Scottish counterparts.

While a few British clubs (e.g. Watford, Oxford United, Millwall etc.) have introduced schemes to enable closer contact between fans and club officials, the large majority seem quite unwilling to take responsibility for the behaviour of their fans. Even those who have received government grants under the 'Football in the Community' scheme have largely instituted fairly token football coaching and school visit programmes.

While football hooliganism appears to be on the decline, at least in the UK, the problems that remain are unlikely to be eradicated simply through additional – and in some people's view, oppressive – controls on the movement of fans, curbs on the availability of alcohol or similarly simplistic 'solutions' to a complex phenomenon.

In line with the views of many researchers in this area, and with the opinions of representatives of formal and informal fans' groups throughout Europe, we see a continuing need for stronger involvement of the football clubs themselves in helping to re-direct and curb the occasionally disruptive and violent behaviour of a small minority of their fans. This might best be achieved through the increased establishment of local fans' forums, through which supporters and club Directors would have a much stronger channel of communication. These, allied to the fan coaching schemes run by local authorities, might succeed in changing fan behaviour on the simple presumption that they are less likely to damage the reputation of a club in which they feel they have a genuine involvement.

Little research on football hooliganism has included a specific focus on the role of alcohol. Work by John Williams1 and Richard Giulianotti2 includes discussion of the possible 'aggravating' effects in the case of English and Scottish fans, but few empirical data are presented concerning consumption rates or specific effects of alcohol. For most researchers and theorists, the issue of alcohol is, at best, peripheral and in Italian work it is, as we might expect, not considered at all.

The 'alcohol- violence connection'

This is in stark contrast to media coverage of football fan behaviour, particularly in the UK. Here 'drunkenness' is by far the most often reported cause of violent disorder, even in circumstances where there is no evidence of excessive drinking. In line with this populist view, most official enquiries into football hooliganism have dwelt on the 'problem' of alcohol and urged its restriction at football matches. Even government sponsored publications concerning Crime Prevention Initiatives include sweeping conclusions about the 'dangers' of alcohol consumption by football fans:

“Some offences are alcohol-related by definition – drink-driving for example. But these are by no means the only ones where alcohol plays a large part. Public disorder, including football hooliganism and vandalism is particularly associated with it.”

Controls on the availability of alcohol at football matches have now existed for some time in Britain3 and the European Parliament has recently included a Europe-wide ban on alcohol in its recommendations. Much of the EP debate, however, was driven by British and German MEPs and it is clear that alcohol is seen as a significant factor in this context only by northern Europeans.

Consideration of the association between drinking and football hooliganism lies within a much broader debate concerning the role of alcohol in the generation of violent and criminal behaviour. This issue has been reviewed at length in other publications and we will not dwell here on the complexities of the issue.4 It is clear, however, that the perceived alcohol-violence connection is primarily restricted to Northern European and Anglo Saxon cultures. Elsewhere in the world quite contrary perceptions exist. Where alcohol can be shown to have a direct impact on levels of aggression and anti-social behaviour, the effect is largely mediated by immediate social factors and more general, pervasive cultural expectations.

Culture and alcohol

The cultural nature of the relationship between alcohol and football is evident from a rare 'natural experiment' involving Aston Villa fans attending a European Cup Final against Bayern Munich in the Feyenoord Stadium in Rotterdam. This took place in 1982 at a time when concern about the drinking behaviour of English fans was at a peak. The bar at the back of the terraces occupied by Villa fans served lager which, unknown to them, was alcohol-free. (Bayern fans had access to 'normal' lager). John Williams comments on this 'trick' in Hooligans Abroad:

“ ... Villa supporters who made the endless trek back and forth to the bars, carrying six cartons with the aid of a specially designed cardboard tray, believed themselves to be en route to getting well and truly 'steaming' ... To get drunk in the Villa end that night, one would need to drink more than the 'lager' on sale to English fans. What officials later described as the 'big con' was in full swing. While fans in other sections of the ground were sinking the real thing, Villa fans were the subject of a non-alcoholic delusion.” 5

Ambivalence about alcohol

While most observers of this 'con' noted with interest the apparently 'drunken' behaviour of Villa fans, Williams is more ambivalent about the extent to which the effects of alcohol are psychologically mediated. He suggests, for example, that the drunkenness in some cases might have been 'real' and due to drinking prior to the game – a suggestion for which he offers no evidence. Elsewhere in Williams' writing the ambivalence concerning alcohol is replaced with self-contradictory stances. Take, for example, his view expressed at a conference in 1989:

“We are regularly told that it is drink which releases the full force of this natural wickedness, and that curbs on drinking will bottle it up. Someone should inform the Danes and the Irish of these findings. Supporters from these countries were among the most drunken and the most friendly fans in West Germany. The message might also reach UEFA who sanctioned a major brewer as the Championships' sponsor!”

This dismissal of the relevance of alcohol by Williams is followed, three years later, by a non sequitor call for restrictions on the availability of alcohol to British fans abroad:

“We recommend that for the foreseeable future, and with the support of the continental authorities concerned, an alcohol ban should operate for all England matches on the continent.”6

Other inconsistencies are evident in Williams' work and it is, perhaps, ironic that he should make such recommendations given his insistence that football violence derives from deeply entrenched social factors within British society rather than from immediate situational or psychological processes.

The roligans

The Danish fans, about whose 'drunken but friendly' behaviour Williams makes favourable comment, are an interesting example. The Danish 'Roligans' are fanatical football supporters who are renowned for their levels of beer consumption. They are also Northern European and might be expected, therefore, to be among those for whom group drinking sessions often end in belligerence and fighting. Their conduct, however, is quite different from that associated with English fans and, to a lesser extent with their German and Dutch contemporaries. The analysis provided by Eichberg of the Danish Sport Research Institute sums up their distinctiveness succinctly:

“The roligan displays a feature which links him with his counterpart, the hooligan: excessive alcohol consumption. English, Irish and Danish fans compete for the position of being the most drunk – yet fundamentally different behaviour patterns arise. Where the heavy drinking of English hooligans impels aggression and violence, the roligan is characterised by the absence of violence and companiable cheerfulness.” 7

The behaviour of Danish fans at Euro '96, has also been the subject of much favourable comment by the media and the police. Commenting on the amusing and good-natured antics of the Danes in Sheffield, Cathy Cassell and Jon Rea 8 noted:

“Such characteristics endeared Sheffielders towards them. No matter how much lager they consumed, and how badly the team performed, the atmosphere wherever they congregated was nothing short of a party. The city did well out of it ... Numerous pubs ran dry. The police and council officials expressed their amazement that such amounts of beer could be consumed by so many football supporters with no trouble at all.”

The police view

The 'surprise' expressed by the police about the good-natured drunkenness of Danish fans is understandable given their assumptions about alcohol and hooliganism in the UK. We should note, however, that the police are less ready to blame drink than some newspaper reports have suggested. A study was conducted of the views of Police Commanders who were responsible for crowd control at all 92 English League clubs. They were asked “How serious an influence is heavy drinking in contributing to football-related disorder in your town?”. Concerning Home fans, only 11% saw it as being the 'single most serious influence', while a further 20% rated it as 'serious'. Almost half of the Commanders felt that alcohol was an influence, but not a serious one, while the remainder felt that it was not an influence at all. Their views regarding visiting Away fans, however, were a little different. Here 18% felt that alcohol was the most significant influence while 35% rated it as serious.

These are, of course, views rather than empirical facts and based upon, we presume, observations that many fans in the UK, and away fans in particular, tend to consume alcohol prior to engaging in acts of hooliganism. Despite the implicit assumptions, however, this does not mean that acts of hooliganism would necessarily be less frequent if alcohol were less readily available, or likely to increase in frequency when drinking levels were higher.

Take, for example, the extensions to licensing hours in Manchester and elsewhere during Euro '96. At the time Commander John Purnell, head of policing for the championships, was concerned about such 'liberalising' of drinking: “History shows that a tiny minority will drink more than they can handle and, while under the influence of alcohol, will behave badly.” The Home Secretary, Michael Howard, also joined the debate, claiming that the magistrates and Licensing Justices in Manchester were acting “incongruously and inappropriately”.

The fears of Commander Purnell and Michael Howard were largely unfounded. There were very few reported incidences of trouble during the tournament. The only event of significance took place in London, where licenses had notbeen extended.

Unexpected consequences of alcohol bans

Increasing restrictions on the availability of alcohol at football matches may not only be inappropriate but possibly have negative side-effects. There is increasing evidence that such restrictions are already prompting some fans to substitute a variety of drugs for lager. John Williams has already noted an increase in the use of cannabis as a direct consequence of the potential penalties for being in possession of alcohol in a British football stadium. Others note the increased use of MDMA (ecstasy) in such contexts. Evidence of a more concrete kind concerning unanticipated effects of restrictions comes from a study in the United States, the implications of which are generalisable to other countries and settings. Boyes and Faith conducted a detailed study of the impact of a ban on alcohol at (American) football games at Arizona State University. They hypothesised that such a ban would lead to 'intertemporal' substitution of the consumption of alcohol – i.e. fans would increase their consumption immediately prior to, and after leaving the football games. Such substitution, they argued could more more damaging than the effects which might arise from intoxication within the stadium and such negative consequences could be measured in, for example, increased numbers of fans driving before and after the match while over the legal BAC limit. The authors argued that there were three reasons to expect such a consequence:

“First, alcohol in the body does not dissipate quickly ... Thus the effects of increased drinking in the period prior to the regulated period may carry over into the regulated period. Second, the level of intoxication, during any period depends on the rate of consumption as well as the volume. Thus, even if there is not a one-for-one substitution of consumption from the restricted period to the adjacent unregulated periods, average intoxication taken over the adjacent and unregulated periods can increase. Third, studies indicate that the probability of having a traffic accident increases at an increasing level of intoxication. Thus, the social costs of drinking and driving in the unregulated periods may increase.” 9

Boyes and Faith examined police data concerning alcohol-related driving accidents, detected DWI (Driving while intoxicated) cases and other measures for the periods before and after the restrictions on alcohol in the stadium. They found significant increases of up to 40% in blood alcohol concentrations in drivers stopped by the police. This is despite an increase in the penalties for DWI and an increase in the legal driving age in the postban period.

The implications of this study are very relevant to restrictions on alcohol at British football stadiums. They also suggest that the recent proposals from European Parliament committees for a Europe-wide ban on alcohol at football matches may be misguided. If alcohol is a significant determinant of anti-social behaviour, directly or indirectly, the effects of intertemporal substitution of drinking, which alcohol bans are likely to generate, will tend to increase the likelihood of aggression both prior to and shortly after the games. Such behaviour, of course, is also likely to occur outside of the stadiums where, it is more difficult to police and control.

The case of the Scots

If total bans on alcohol at football games are inappropriate, for the reasons discussed above, alternative means need to be explored for modifying alcohol-related behaviour among football fans, and English fans in particular. This may seem an impossible prospect. The change in the behaviour of Scottish fans, however, is of interest in this context. We noted earlier in Section 3 that although Scottish fans are often 'heavy' consumers of alcohol, the belligerent behaviour which used to be associated with their drinking has changed quite substantially over the last ten to fifteen years. As Giulianotti 10 has noted, the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act of 1980, which prohibits the possession of alcohol at, or in transit to, a football match, has done little to dent the degree to which alcohol is very much part of the football experience. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that the 'drunkenness' of Scottish fans now presents far less of a threat to law and order than it might once have done.

This transformation of Scottish fan behaviour, according to Giulianotti, has come about through their desire to distance themselves from their English rivals and to present an image of themselves throughout Europe as the 'friendly' supporters. In pursuit of this aim the meaning of alcohol has been substantially altered and now, instead of being a precursor to aggression and fights, is the 'liquid' facilitation of positive social affect and good humour.

Although some 'traditional' drunken fighting remains among Scottish fan groups, the majority seem to have moved away from the English 'hooligan' model to one which is more characteristic of the Danish roligans. If this radical change of behaviour can occur among the Scots, without any apparent decline in their consumption levels, then we must assume that similar shifts are possible in English fan culture. While drinking among Dutch and German fans generally presents less of a problem, we might also anticipate the possibility of further change in these groups as well.

Introduction

Racism is a problem for football across Europe and is an important factor in the problem of football hooliganism itself. The actual extent of racism is virtually impossible to measure as detailed statistics in this context are almost non-existent. Nevertheless, acts of football disorder, especially on the international scene, have frequently been referred to as 'racist', or perpetrated by racist groups, and some clubs are now viewed as having an inherently racist support.

In this section the various forms of racism will be considered, with emphasis on the role of extreme right-wing groups, as these have frequently been reported to be involved in football-related violence. The various campaigns and schemes designed to combat racism will also be considered.

The first professional black player in Britain is believed to have been Arthur Wharton, who signed for Darlington FC in 1889. Nowadays, a black player is by no means unusual. In fact, around 25% of professional players are black. However, in the 1993/94 season Carling survey of Premier League fans, only 1% of fans described themselves as 'non-white'. It is argued that this is due to a prevalence of racism amongst traditional soccer fans.

In an attempt to redress the problem, the Campaign for Racial Equality (CRE), the Football Supporters Association (FSA) and the Professional Footballers Association (PFA) have all launched initiatives to try and rid football grounds of racism and encourage more people from ethnic minorities to attend matches. Their techniques and levels of success will be discussed later, but let us start by examining the actual types of racism that exist in football stadiums.

Forms of Racism

Racist chanting in the 1970s and 1980s often took the form of members of the crowd making monkey noises at black players on the pitch. Other abuse has been more specific. For example, after the Deptford fire in 1981 when 13 black youths were burnt to death, a chant that could be heard at Millwall was:

“We all agree
Niggers burn better than petrol”

Anti-Semitic chants have also been heard. Tottenham Hotspur supporters have often been the target for this:

“Those yids from Tottenham
The gas man's got them
Oh those yids from White Hart Lane”

Other chants are more closely linked to patriotism and as such the national team:

“Stand by the Union Jack
Send those niggers back
If you're white, you're alright
If you're black, send 'em back”

The 1991 Football (Offences) Act made racist chanting at football matches unlawful, but is largely inadequate as chanting is defined as the "repeated uttering of any words or sounds in concert with one or more others". As a result an individual shouting racist abuse on his own can only be charged under the 1986 Public Order Act for using "obscene and foul language at football grounds". This loophole has allowed several offenders to escape conviction for racism at football matches.

The level of influence that far-right groups have amongst football fans is a highly debatable issue but over the years they have been present in many football grounds across Britain. Garland and Rowe1 suggest that far-right groups have targeted football fans since at least the 1930s, when the British Union of Fascists tried to attract the young working class male supporters into their brigade of uniformed 'stewards'. In the 1950s the White Defence League sold their newspaper Black and White News at football grounds in London.

It was the 1970s, however, that saw far-right groups rise to prominence as the problem of football hooliganism grew in the national conscience. The National Front (NF) was the most active group in the 1970s, giving regular coverage in its magazine Bulldog to football and encouraging hooligan groups to compete for the title of 'most racist ground in Britain'. Copies of Bulldog were openly sold at many clubs and, at West Ham, club memorabilia was sold doctored with NF slogans. Chelsea, Leeds United, Millwall, Newcastle United and Arsenal, as well as West Ham United, were all seen as having strong fascist elements in the 1970s and 1980s. After the Heysel stadium tragedy when a wall collapsed killing 39 people fleeing from Liverpool fans, British National Party leaflets were found on the terraces.

It seems that in the 1990s, however, the problem is waning. It is now uncommon to see the open selling of far-right literature or memorabilia at football matches and an incident such as the John Barnes one would be unlikely to happen now. But this does not mean to say that the problem has gone away, especially amongst the support for the English national side. During the 1980s, far-right groups were often in attendance at England's matches abroad. Williams and his colleagues2 identified a presence of NF members in the English support, especially amongst the Chelsea contingent, at the 1982 World Cup in Spain.

As recently as 1995, far-right groups have been involved in disturbances abroad, namely at the England vs. Republic of Ireland 'friendly' match at Lansdowne Road, Dublin when fights between rival fans caused the game to be abandoned after half an hour. Supporters of the British National Party (BNP) and a militant group called Combat 18 were said to have been involved after racist literature was found at the scene. Anti Republican chanting could clearly be heard at the match and some claim that the violence was actually orchestrated by an umbrella group called the National Socialist Alliance.

The attractions of football matches to far-right groups are obvious. Football grounds provide a useful platform for the groups to make their voices heard. From them their views can be directed into millions of homes. It also seems as if football grounds can be a means to recruit young support. As Dave Robins3 points out:

"The hard-man, though, lives in a more dangerous and unchanging world. Permanently sensitised to 'trouble' in his environment, his paranoid fantasies about defending his 'patch' against outsiders make him ripe for manipulation by the politics of the extreme right"

Their actual influence amongst club support, however, is believed by many to be minimal, a view held by the National Football Intelligence Unit:4

"We are aware that certain right-wing parties have been looking at football hooligans because they see them as an organised group and try to recruit them for this purpose with, I have to say, fairly limited success ... It has been seen as an opportunity by many, but I don't think it has been a dramatic success, there is no evidence for that."

Some debate also exists as to whether right-wing groups deliberately target soccer fans as recruits or whether soccer fans are drawn into the groups because of the opportunities they offer for violence. Robins is drawn towards the former argument, citing the leafleting campaigns of the 1980s, while David Canter5 argues that the right-wing groups merely cash in on soccer violence, rather than instigate it. One would have to conclude that there are elements of truth in both theories.

Anti-racism initiatives

Recent years have seen a number of attempts by various groups and organisations to combat racism in football. These have come from the club level, supporter level and from organisational bodies such as the Campaign for Racial Equality (CRE), the Professional Footballers Association (PFA) and the Football Supporters Association (FSA).

In 1993 the CRE and PFA launched the Let's Kick Racism Out of Football campaign, "with the aim of highlighting anti-racist and equal opportunities messages within the context of football" .6

It aimed to encourage clubs and supporters groups to launch their own campaigns to combat racism at their clubs. A ten point action plan was laid out for clubs:

1. Issue a statement saying that the club will not tolerate racism, and will take action against supporters who engage in racist abuse, racist chanting or intimidation.

2. Make public announcements condemning any racist chanting at matches, and warning supporters that the club will not hesitate to take action.

3. Make it a condition for season ticket holders that they do not take part in racist abuse, racist chanting or any other offensive behaviour.

4. Prevent the sale or distribution of racist literature in and around the ground on match-days.

5. Take disciplinary action against players who make racially abusive remarks at players, officials or supporters before, during or after matches.

6. Contact other clubs to make sure they understand the club's policy on racism.

7. Make sure stewards and the police understand the problem and the club's policy, and have a common strategy for removing or dealing with supporters who are abusive and breaking the law on football offences.

8. Remove all racist graffiti from the ground as a matter of urgency.

9. Adopt an equal opportunities policy to cover employment and service provision.

10. Work with other groups and agencies – such as the police, the local authority, the PFA, the supporters, schools, etc. – to develop initiatives to raise awareness of the campaign and eliminate racist abuse and discrimination.

The campaign stated that:

"If football is to be played and enjoyed equally by everyone, whatever the colour of their skin, and wherever they come from, it is up to us all, each and every one of us, to refuse to tolerate racist attitudes, and to demand nothing less than the highest standards in every area of the game."

A magazine, Kick It!, was produced with funding from the Football Trust and 110,000 copies of a fanzine, United Colours of Football, were given out free at grounds across the country on the opening day of the 1994/95 season.

Initial reaction to the scheme was not entirely positive. Some thought that it may only serve to bring negative publicity to the game, by highlighting the problem of racism in football. Others claimed that racism was not a problem at their ground and therefore they had no need for such a campaign. Despite this, the first season of the campaign had the support of all but one of the professional clubs and all professional authorities.

In a survey conducted by Garland and Rowe in December 1994, 49 fanzine editors from a wide range of clubs were asked to comment on levels of racism at their club. Many were skeptical about the success of Let's Kick Racism Out of Football, with only 32% citing the campaign as a factor in the perceived decrease in racism at football matches in the last five years.

Garland and Rowe suggest that this lack of support may stem from mistaken expectations of the campaign. As mentioned earlier, the aim of the CRE and PFA was to encourage clubs to launch their own initiatives, rather than control the whole campaign themselves. In this sense it has been largely successful, as it prompted many clubs to launch their own campaigns.

The most ambitious of these have been Derby County's scheme Rams Against Racism and Charlton Athletic's Red, White and Black at the Valley. Derby County went so far as to dedicate a home match day in 1994 to the cause of combating racism after liaisons between club officials, the club's Football and Community Development Officer and the Racial Equality Council. Anti-racist banners were displayed, campaign messages printed in the match day programme and players involved. Two-hundred and fifty free tickets were also given out to local children. A long term aim of the scheme was to encourage the local Asian community to attend more games as well as encouraging local Asian footballing talent.

Red, White and Black at the Valley was a leaflet launched by Charlton Athletic in conjunction with the police, the local Racial Equality Council, Greenwich Council and the supporters club. The aim was to present Charlton Athletic as being a club that people from all disadvantaged minorities could come and watch without fear of harassment from other supporters. After the leaflet had been distributed the club continued by producing posters and issuing statements in the programmes. Players also visited local schools and colleges.

Garland and Rowe point out that it is difficult to calculate how effective these schemes have been, although a drive by the police (acting on a tip-off from the club) was successful in removing racist fans from one end of the Valley ground.

The first fan-based group set up specifically to fight racism was Leeds Fans United Against Racism And Fascism (LFUARAF). This was formed in 1987 to combat the influence of far-right groups at Elland Road, especially the most visible displays of paper selling etc. The first step was to distribute anti-racist leaflets outside the ground, then in 1988 it contributed to Terror On Our Terraces, a report on the involvement of the far-right amongst the Leeds crowd. This prompted the club to recognise the problem and they issued an anti-racist statement signed by both management and players. Within a few months the number of far-right paper sellers decreased significantly and the campaign is still active today.

In Scotland, supporters have formed a national campaign to combat racism in football. SCARF (Supporters' Campaign Against Racism in Football) was formed in 1991 in response to an increase in far-right activity at Scottish grounds, mainly involving the BNP. Most of the campaign consists of leafleting the worst affected grounds, Rangers and Hearts being two examples, but it has not been without its problems. As well as- one female campaigner being threatened and others abused, SCARF say that they have had a problem in getting clubs and officials to recognise that there is a problem at all.

Fanzines started in the mid 1980s and have offered an alternative, positive view of football fans in the post-Heysel era. Now almost every club has at least one fanzine and Garland and Rowe claim that these are almost exclusively anti-racist. Some are actually produced by anti-racist groups themselves such as Marching Altogether (LFUARAF) and Filbo Fever (Leicester City Foxes Against Racism). Other clubs whose fanzines actively support anti-racism campaigns include Everton, Celtic, Manchester United, Cardiff City, Leyton Orient and Chelsea. One criticism levelled at fanzines is that they are simply preaching to the converted as the fans who buy them will already be anti-racist. Nevertheless, fanzines have enjoyed increasing popularity over the last few years which should be recognised as a positive sign and the LFUARAF recognises this problem and for this purpose gives away Marching Altogether free at matches.

The CRE and PFA also believe that the 'civilisation' of football grounds – seating, family enclosures, executive boxes etc. – will encourage more blacks and Asians to attend football matches. They may be right but this has not occurred yet in England. Every football ground in the Premier League is now all-seater yet, as mentioned before, white people constitute 99% of the attendance.

The European dimension

Throughout Europe, racism figures prominently in football related violence. Neo-nazi and neo-fascist groups target football grounds in Europe in the same way as their English equivalents do here. Among the worst affected clubs are Lazio and AC Milan in Italy, Paris Saint-Germain in France, and Real Madrid and Espagnole in Spain.

In Italy, a Jewish player, Ronnie Rosenthal, was unable to play even one game for Udinese because of massive pressure from neo-fascist circles and Aaron Winter, a native of Suriname of Hindustani extraction was subject to attacks at Lazio involving cries of 'Niggers and Jews Out'. More recently, Paul Ince, a black English player for Inter Milan , has expressed his anger at the way he has been treated by the Italian fans.

Germany has one of the worst reputations in Europe for far-right influence amongst its fans, with frequent displays of Hitler salutes, particularly at international matches. Professor Volker Rittner of the Sports Sociology Institute in Cologne, however, believes that these are no more than provocative displays designed to get the fans into the papers, but some reports of right-wing activity in Germany have been disturbing. In 1990 there were reports of skinheads barracking the small number of black players in the Bundesliga and in 1992 similar reports were made of neo-nazi groups in Germany using football matches as occasions to plan and organise attacks against local ethnic communities and East European refugees. An analysis of the political attitudes of German fans revealed that 20% feel close to neo-nazis. Whilst it is not clear how active these fans would be, this is nonetheless a disturbing figure.

Some European countries have initiated similar schemes to the British Let's Kick Racism Out of Football campaign. The Netherlands uses the motto When Racism Wins, the Sport Loses which is displayed on posters at train stations and at tram and bus stops. Players in the Netherlands even went on strike in protest against racism. Players have also led the way in Italy by threatening to walk off the pitch if black players continued to be abused by racists. This resulted in a day of action in December 1992 when all players in the top two divisions displayed the slogan No Al Razzismo! (No To Racism). In Switzerland, footballers from the national team are involved in 'street football' competitions for young people, held in a different town each weekend.

A more general campaign is the All Different – All Equal campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance, organised by the Council of Europe. Football players from many countries have been involved, most notably in Sweden where the national team appeared in a short video, shown several times on national TV, to promote the campaign.

Conclusion

Although actual levels of racism are extremely hard to quantify and statistics thin on the ground, it seems apparent that the last decade has seen a reduction in the levels of racism at football matches in England. Garland and Rowe's survey revealed that 84% of the fanzine editors who responded felt that levels of racism had decreased over the past five years, with over half of these claiming a significant decline. Only 6% felt that racism had increased during this time. Garland and Rowe also claim that this view was backed up by nearly all of the administrators, players and officials interviewed in addition to the survey.

The role of fan-based groups and the growth of fanzine culture were the two most cited reasons for the decline in racism, although this may not be surprising given that the respondents were all fanzine editors. Perhaps more important, therefore, is the fact that 57% believed that the increase in the number of black players was a major factor for the decrease in racism.

As mentioned earlier, only a third of the respondents felt that the campaigns by the CRE and the FSA were a factor. Nevertheless, all of the respondents were aware of the Let's Kick Racism Out of Football Campaign and 44% felt that it had raised public awareness of the problem.

As Garland and Rowe point out, however, less public forms of racism may still be present and support for the national team seems still to have distinct racist factions to it, as last year's Lansdowne Road disturbance indicated. In any case, the lack of support from ethnic minorities suggests that clubs, authorities and fans still need to go a long way in convincing people that they will not encounter racism at football grounds.

Racism in other parts of Europe does not look as if it is decreasing and in some parts may be increasing. In Germany, the neo-nazi and neo-fascist movements continue to increase their support and the Front National in France, led by Jean Marie Le Pen, holds public support across the board, football supporters being no exception.

The issue of racism in football has been raised this year in a report to the European Parliament on football hooliganism, drafted by the German Green Group MEP Claudia Roth and presented in April. (See also Section 8) The committee was said to be:

" ... shocked at the racist demonstrations and attacks perpetrated on players who are black or Jewish or come from different national or ethnic backgrounds"

and

" ... concerned at the ways in which extremist organisations deliberately exploit violence connected with sport including the manipulation and infiltration of hooligan groups".

The report goes on to suggest that players should take an active role in combating racism by refusing to play if "violent, racist, xenophobic or anti-Semitic behaviour" occurs. It also calls for a Europe-wide ban on any racist or xenophobic symbols being displayed at football matches. Perhaps most importantly, the report calls for a European day of anti-racism and fair play in sport to be held throughout Europe in 1997 (the European Year Against Racism) and involving sports personalities to help promote the campaign.

According to the Labour MEP Glyn Ford (Kick It Again, 1995), UEFA has so-far not adopted any specific measures to combat racism in football. They argue that their 'Fair Play' scheme is adequate in tackling the problem. In this, behaviour both on and off the field is evaluated, and negative marks are given for racist chanting or the display of racist slogans. At the end of the season the three national associations with the best records are awarded an extra place in the UEFA Cup for one of their clubs. Whilst this may provide some sort of incentive for fans not to be racist, critics argue that this is not enough.

In an international context, the media, in particular the English tabloid press, it is argued, play a part in encouraging racism and xenophobia at football matches and this was also recognised in the European Parliament report. In the report's explanatory statement the committee states that the media frequently present international matches as 'warlike confrontations' which thus give rise to jingoism and sometimes acts of violence. The committee recommends that the media should endeavour to bring the sporting aspect back into sport.

While one must recognise that the problem of racism is different in each country, a Europe-wide initiative to combat the problem must surely be welcomed.

Football hooliganism can be seen as something of an easy target' for the media. With journalists present at every match across the country, the chances of a story being missed are slim. TV cameras also mean that disturbances within stadiums are caught on video. Since the 1960s, in fact, journalists have been sent to football matches to report on crowd behaviour, rather than just the game 1.

The British tabloid press in particular have an enthusiastic' approach to the reporting of soccer violence, with sensationalist headlines such as “Smash These Thugs!”, “Murder on a Soccer Train!” (Sun), “Mindless Morons” and “Savages! Animals!” (Daily Mirror) 2. Whilst open condemnation of hooligans is the norm across the media, it has been argued that this sensationalist style of reporting presents football violence as far more of a concern than it actually is, elevating it to a major social problem'. The problem of press sensationalism was recognised in the 1978 Report on Public Disorder and Sporting Events, carried out by the Sports Council and Social Science Research Council. It observed that:

“It must be considered remarkable, given the problems of contemporary Britain, that football hooliganism has received so much attention from the Press. The events are certainly dramatic, and frightening for the bystander, but the outcome in terms of people arrested and convicted, people hurt, or property destroyed is negligible compared with the number of people potentially involved.”

Furthermore, some critics argue that media coverage of hooliganism has actually contributed to the problem . More recently, the popular press has been criticised for it's pre-match reporting during the 1996 European Championships.

History

Press boxes were first installed at football matches in the 1890s, although the reporting of football matches goes back considerably further than this. The study by Murphy, Dunning and Williams 3 shows that disorder was a regular occurrence at football matches before the First World War, and newspaper reports of trouble were common. However, the style of reporting was a long way away from the coverage which hooliganism receives today.

Most reports before the First World War were made in a restrained fashion. Little social comment was made and the articles were small and factual, often placed under a heading such as Football Association Notes' 4.

“ ... Loughborough had much the best of matters and the Gainsborough goal survived several attacks in a remarkable manner, the end coming with the score:
Loughborough, none
Gainsborough, none

The referee's decisions had caused considerable dissatisfaction, especially that disallowing a goal to Loughborough in the first half, and at the close of the game he met with a very unfavourable reception, a section of the crowd hustling him and it was stated that he was struck.” 5

It is hard to imagine a present day report of an incident such as this being written with such impartiality and lack of concern.

During the inter-war years, the style of reporting began to change. As newspapers gave more space to advertising, stories had to be considered more for their newsworthiness' than before. What is interesting to note about Murphy et al's study here is that they argue that the press facilitated (consciously or not) the view that football crowds were becoming more orderly and well behaved by underplaying, or just not reporting, incidents which did occur. At the same time, however, a small amount of concern and condemnation began to creep in to reports.

This trend continued for a decade or so after the Second World War and it is this period which is often referred to as football's hey-day: a time of large, enthusiastic, but well-behaved crowds. Murphy et al argue that this was not necessarily the case and that although incidents of disorder were on the decrease, those that did occur often went un-reported.

The roots of today's style of reporting of football violence can be traced back to the mid 1950s. At a time when there was widespread public fear over rising juvenile crime and about youth violence in general, the press began to carry more and more stories of this nature and football matches were an obvious place to find them. Although many reports still attempted to down-play the problem, the groundwork was laid as articles began to frequently refer to a hooligan minority of fans

By the mid-1960s, with the World Cup to be held in England drawing closer, the press expressed dire warnings of how the hooligans could ruin the tournament. The World Cup passed without incident but the moral panic concerning hooliganism continued to increase.

By the 1970s calls for tougher action on trouble-makers became common place in the tabloid's headlines: "Smash These Thugs" (Sun, 4 October 1976), "Thump and Be Thumped" (Daily Express, 25 November 1976), "Cage the Animals" (Daily Mirror, 21 April 1976) and "Birch em!" (Daily Mirror, 30 August 1976).

During the 1980s, many of these demands were actually met by the British authorities, in the wake of tragedies such as the Heysel deaths in 1985, "Cage The Animals" turning out to be particularly prophetic. As these measures were largely short-sighted, they did not do much to quell the hooliganism, and may have in fact made efforts worse. As such, football hooliganism continued to feature heavily in the newspapers and mass media in general and still does today.

Theory

The main bodies of work we will consider here are that of Stuart Hall in the late 1970s and that of Patrick Murphy and his colleagues at Leicester in the late 1980s.

Stuart Hall in The treatment of football hooliganism in the Press, identifies what he calls the amplification spiral' whereby exaggerated coverage of a problem can have the effect of worsening it: 6

"If the official culture or society at large comes to believe that a phenomenon is threatening, and growing, it can be led to panic about it. This often precipitates the call for tough measures of control. This increased control creates a situation of confrontation, where more people than were originally involved in the deviant behaviour are drawn into it ... Next week's confrontation' will then be bigger, more staged, so will the coverage, so will the public outcry, the pressure for yet more control..."

This spiral effect, Hall argues, has been particularly apparent in the coverage of football hooliganism since the mid 1960s. The press' technique of "editing for impact" is central to Hall's theory. The use of "graphic headlines, bold type-faces, warlike imagery and epithets..." serves to sensationalise and exaggerate the story.

This approach is supported by a later study by Patrick Murphy and his colleagues7. They argue that the particular shape which football hooliganism has taken since the 1960s, i.e. "regular confrontations between named rival groups", has arisen partly out of press coverage of incidents. In particular, the predictive style of reporting which often appeared in the tabloids such as "Scandal of Soccer's Savages – Warming up for the new season" (Daily Mirror, 20 August 1973) and "Off – To a Riot" (People, 2 August 1970).

In 1967, a Chelsea fan appearing in court charged with carrying a razor said in his defence that he had "read in a local newspaper that the West Ham lot were going to cause trouble". 8

This predictive style of reporting is most apparent when the English national side is involved in international tournaments. During the build up to the World Cup in Italy, 1990 the English Press gave out grave warnings of violence in Italy. The Sun quoted anonymous English fans as saying there was going to be "... a bloodbath – someone is going to get killed" (31 May 1990), while the Daily Mirror claimed Sardinians were arming themselves with knives for the visit of the English who were "ready to cause havoc" on the island (27 May 1990). This anticipation of trouble meant that media presence at the tournament was very substantial, and competition for a story' fierce, resulting in journalists picking up the smallest of incidents. John Williams9 also claims that journalists may have paid English fans to pose for photographs.

"By defining matchdays and football grounds as times and places in which fighting could be engaged in and aggressive forms of masculinity displayed, the media, especially the national tabloid press, played a part of some moment in stimulating and shaping the development of football hooliganism."

Furthermore, Murphy argues that the press have played a role in decisions over policy making to deal with football hooliganism, resulting in largely short-sighted measures which have in the main shifted violence from the terraces onto the streets and towns outside the football grounds.

Evidently, social explanations of football violence do not make great headlines and it is rare that a report of football violence in the popular press will include such an insight, if it does it tends to be a short remark, buried away at the end of the article. Thus, as Hall points out, "If you lift social violence out of it's social context, the only thing you are left with is – bloody heads." In fact, the explanations offered to us by the popular press usually aim to dismiss the violence as irrational, stupid and ultimately animalistic – "RIOT! United's Fans Are Animals" (Sunday People, 29 August 1975) and "SAVAGES! ANIMALS!" ( Daily Mirror, 21 April 1975).

This has serious consequences, as Melnick points out:

"The mass media in general and the national press in particular can take major credit for the public's view of the soccer hooligan as a cross between the Neanderthal Man and Conan the Barbarian".10

By labelling the actions of football hooligans like this, it is easy for the tabloid press to make calls for tougher action from the authorities. If the violence has no rationale or reason then what can be done but use force against it?

"Another idea might be to put these people in hooligan compounds' every Saturday afternoon ... They should be herded together preferably in a public place. That way they could be held up to ridicule and exposed for what they are – mindless morons with no respect for other people's property or wellbeing. We should make sure we treat them like animals – for their behaviour proves that's what they are".11

Contrasted with these calls for harsh punishments have been more blatant forms of glorification of hooliganism, most obviously in the publishing of league tables of hooligan notoriety':

"Today the Mirror reveals the end-of-term arrest' record of First Division Clubs' supporters covering every league match played by 22 teams. The unique report compiled with the help of 17 police forces reflects the behaviour of both home' and away' fans at each ground. The record speaks for itself; Manchester United were bottom of the League of Shame by more than 100 arrests." 12

League tables were published in several other newspapers, including the Daily Mail, during the mid 1970s. However, in 1984, when a report by a working group in the government's Department of the Environment, entitled Football Spectator Violence, recommended that the police should compile a league table of the country's most notorious hooligan groups to help combat the problem, many newspapers replied with disgust and outrage that this should be published (which it wasn't going to be), arguing that doing so could incite hooligan competition. Importantly, as Murphy et al assert, this shows that the press recognise that publicity can influence football hooliganism.

Criticism has also been aimed at the tabloid press for the attitude it takes in its build-up to major international matches. Two days before England's semi-final match against Germany in this year's European Championships, the Mirror carried the front page headline "Achtung! Surrender. For you Fritz ze Euro 96 Championship is over" while the editorial, also on the front page, consisted of a parody of Neville Chamberlain's 1939 announcement of the outbreak of war with Hitler: "Mirror Declares Football War on Germany". Elsewhere, the war metaphors continued: "Let's Blitz Fritz" (Sun) and "Herr We Go" (Daily Star).

Condemnation of the tabloids was widespread, but in fact they had done it before. Before England played the Federal Republic of Germany in the semi-final of the 1990 World Cup, The Sun printed the headline "We Beat Them In 45 ... Now The Battle of 90"

Following the disturbances across Britain after the match, in which a battle between English fans and police broke out in London's Trafalgar Square and a Russian student was stabbed in Brighton, mistakenly being identified as a German, some critics were keen to point the finger at the xenophobia of the tabloid press in encouraging racist and violent action. A report produced by the National Heritage Select Committee, led by Labour MP Gerald Kaufman, concluded that the tabloid press coverage "may well have had it's effect in stimulating the deplorable riots".

Even without considering whether the disturbances that night constituted deplorable riots' or not, this claim is highly debatable. What is clear, however, is that certain double standards exist within the tabloid press. On the one hand they are keen to label the actions of hooligans as moronic' and evil' whilst at the same time they encourage the jingoistic and xenophobic views so prevalent within the national hooligan scene. A study by Blain and O'Donnell, involving 3,000 newspaper reports from 10 countries covering the 1990 World Cup claimed that "There is nothing elsewhere in Europe like the aggressiveness towards foreigners of the British popular press."13.

It is not just in the international context that one finds this aggressive style of reporting but also in general football journalism. Headlines such as "C-R-U-N-C-H", "FOREST'S BLITZ", "POWELL BLAST SHOCKS STOKE", and "Doyle's Karate Gets Him Chopped" were found in the sports pages of just one edition of the Sunday People14. Stuart Hall claims that if football reporting is shrouded in violent, war metaphors and graphic imagery then one should not be surprised that this spills over on to the terraces.

"...the line between the sports reporter glorying in the battles on the pitch, and expressing his righteous moral indignation at the battle on the terraces is a very fine and wavery one indeed" 15.

The role of the media in other European countries

Studies of media reporting of football hooliganism elsewhere in Europe have been rather limited. This may be due to the more benign' reporting of fans in other countries or to the relative novelty of the football violence phenomenon in some cases. The most significant studies have been conducted in Italy and the Netherlands, with less substantial work in Denmark and Austria. Work on Scottish fans by Giulianotti, however, is also relevant in this section.

Italy

Alessandro dal Lago16 analyses the coverage of football hooliganism in the Italian media. He identifies two phases in reporting football matches by the press. Before the 1970s each match was covered at most by two articles. The attention of the reporters was more focused on the players than on the terraces, when violence occurred it was reported as a secondary event in the context of the article. The second phase comes from the mid 1970s. Now attention was focused on the ends' ( the terraces behind the goals favoured by the Italian ultras) and outside the stadium. Football incidents were given the honour' of separate articles independent from the reports of football matches.

Dal Lago recognises the amplifying role which the media plays and claims that the ultras are aware of it to the extent that banners displayed in the ends' frequently include messages to journalists. For example in June 1989, a week after a Roma supporter had died and three Milan fans arrested, a banner displayed by the Milan ultras was directed at Biscardi, a presenter of a popular sports programme Il Processo del Lunedi (The Monday Trial). It read "Biscardi sei figlio di bastardi" (Biscardi you are a son of bastards).

Dal Lago states that widespread hatred exists on the part of both groups, with expressions such as beasts' and stupid' used by the ultras to describe the media and by the media to describe the ultras.

The Netherlands

A study by van der Brug and Meijs set out to see what the influence of the Dutch media coverage of hooliganism is on the hooligans themselves. A survey was conducted in which there were 53 respondents from different sides' (groups of fans so called after the section of the ground in which they are usually located) in Holland. Put to them were a series of statements to see whether they agreed / disagreed etc. Statements which featured the strongest levels of agreement among the respondents were "It is fun when the side is mentioned in the newspaper or on television", "Side supporters think it is important that newspapers write about their side" and "When I read in the newspaper that there will be extra police, it makes the coming match more interesting". 17

The authors conclude that:

"There is no doubt whatsoever that the media have some effect on football hooliganism."

Scotland

We have seen earlier that the media has played a large part in the shaping of the present day view of football hooligans in England. It is interesting, therefore, to consider the example of Scottish fans and their transformation, in the public's eyes, from British hooligans' to Scottish fans'. Since 1981 the Scottish Tartan Army' has consciously sought to acquire an international reputation for boisterous friendliness to the host nation and opposing fans through carnivalesque' behaviour 18. The media has played a very important role in this. By organising themselves into very large groups at matches abroad, the Scottish fans attract a great deal of media attention, but by displaying themselves as nothing more than friendly, albeit drunken, fans their press coverage is predominantly positive. The Scottish media has been behind this transformation, namely by representing English fans as hooligans and by underplaying any trouble which has occurred involving Scottish fans.

Denmark

A similar story exists in Denmark where the Roligans' (see section 4) have an impeccable reputation as the antithesis of the English hooligan'. Peitersen and Skov19 identified the role that the media played in forming this reputation:

"The Danish popular press were an active force in support of the Danish roligans and the fantastic reputation that they have achieved in the international press ... the Danish popular press came to have a similar role to that played by the English popular press for the hooligans, but with reversed polarity. While the Danish press supported recognisable positive trends encompassing companionship, fantasy, humour and pride, the English press helped to intensify and refine violence among English spectators by consciously focusing on and exaggerating the violence and the shame."

Austria

Roman Horak20 also claims that a spate of de-amplification of football violence in the Austrian press occured in the mid to late 1980s As a result hooligans lost the coverage which they had previously thrived upon, and the number of incidents decreased.

Conclusion

It is evident that the media plays a very significant role in the public's view of football hooliganism. By far the biggest problem lies in the sensationalist reporting of the British tabloid press. We have seen how the press has helped form the modern phenomenon of football hooliganism, how it has shaped public opinion of the problem, and how it may directly influence the actions of fans themselves.

There is considerable evidence to support the claim that football hooligans enjoy press coverage and positively attempt to obtain coverage of themselves and their group. In fact, a hooligan group's notoriety and reputation stems largely from reports in the media. The following conversation between two Milwall supporters talking to each other in 1982, is somewhat revealing :

"C – keeps a scrapbook of press cuttings and everything, you should see it, got this great picture from when Milwall went to Chelsea. Great, this Chelsea fan photographed being led away from the shed, with blood pouring out of his white tee shirt. He's clutching his guts like this (illustrates), got stabbed real bad."

"You see that thing in the Sun on Violent Britain'? No? Well I was in it. Well not directly like. I had this Tottenham geezer see. Sliced up his face with my blade – right mess." 21

In Football hooliganism: The Wider Context, Roger Ingham recommended that the media should reduce their tendencies to:

" ... sensationalise, inflate, exaggerate and amplify their stories", advocating "more accurate reporting of events, more careful choice of descriptive terminology, greater efforts to place the events themselves in appropriate contexts".

Ingham also called for the press to think before printing anticipations of disturbances, going so far as to recommend that the Press Council "play a more active role in attempting to ensure accurate and responsible reporting".

However, 18 years on from Ingham's writings we are still faced with the same situation and it is one which looks unlikely to go away. As Melnick 22 points out " ... in the newspaper business, bad news is good news'". A glimmer of hope perhaps stems from the Scottish example talked about earlier, demonstrating that football fans can produce good' stories in the press, although it may be fair to say that many of the stories have only been deemed newsworthy' because of the emphasis on the contrast with English fans.

Horak's claim is also encouraging, indicating that media de-amplification (i.e. playing down stories of football hooliganism) can lead to reductions in levels of violence. In this sense, therefore, Euro 96 could prove to be a turning point in press coverage of football.

Apart from the disturbances in London following the England – Germany match, the European Championships provided almost nothing in the way of hooliganism stories for the press and, as such, stories concentrated on the English team, rather than the fans.

The role of the media was raised in a recent report to the European Parliament on football hooliganism by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs. In this the committee recognises that:

"The media act as magnifiers – they magnify acts of violence and provoke further acts of violence. The media show social problems – the violence in and around football, xenophobia and the racism which is its expression – as if under a magnifying glass. What is nasty becomes nastier because it seems to appear anonymously."

It then goes on to recommend that the media:

" ... participate in the promotion of respect for fair play in sport, to help promote positive sporting values, to combat aggressive and chauvinistic behaviour and to avoid any sensationalism in treating information on violence at sporting events."

Short of outright censorship, however, it is hard to imagine how legislation can reduce sensationalism and exaggeration in the media.

The first groups of 'ultras', football supporters between the ages of 15 and 25 who clearly differed from the classic model of the adult football spectator, appeared in Italy around the end of the 'sixties and early 'seventies. Gathered in the cheaper sectors of stadiums, attracted by clubs through special reduced price subscription campaigns, the ultras immediately displayed a series of unique characteristics totally new to Italian football. These ranged from a marked sense of identification with their own particular "territory", meaning a sector of terrace marked out by banners with the group's name or symbol, to a paramilitary look taken from the one in vogue with a number of extremist political organisations of the time: parka, Dr. Martens boots, camouflage combat suits and jackets worn under scarves with the colours of their clubs.

Initially the 'ultras' distinguished themselves above all for their totally new way of supporting their teams and, in a more general sense, of taking part in the match. From the Brazilian 'Torcidas' came the use of drums and horns, from English soccer fans the 'scarf effect' (massed scarves raised and waiving in a human sea-like optical effect) and chanting, more often than not obsessive, to encourage their heroes or stun and intimidate their adversaries. In this way, support came to be considered as part of the strategy and tactics used to win a match: the "twelfth player", so as to speak. They also made widespread use of pyrotechnics (hand-held signal flares, smoke flares, rockets and coloured Bengal lights), to bring an extra touch of liveliness to the terraces. The concept of "terrace choreography" arose for the first time, a totally original practise that was to evolve as the ultra groups themselves became more organised. Choreography came to be the hallmark of the Italian style: phantasmagoric, enormous, multicoloured shows and spectacle on a vast scale, to great visual effect; the power of all-Italian fantasy. From the stage of Genoa's North Terrace that managed to inspire even the French daily "Le Monde", to Florence's Fiesole curve that outlined the city's monuments based on the original topographic plan.

The longest standing ultra group is Milan's Fossa dei Leoni - the Lion's Den - founded in 1968, which takes the name of the black-and-red's old ground and finds home in the stadium's cheaper sectors at ramp 17. However, some date back further, like the "Fedelissimi Granata" founded in Turin as early as 1951, and still present in the ultra line-up on the Maratona curve. The Sampdoria Ultras appeared in 1969 (the first to call itself "Ultras"), followed by 'the Boys' from Inter. The 'seventies saw the gradual aggregation of the hundreds of tiny groups populating the terraces of the nation's major football stadiums, leading to the formation of major groups like Verona's Yellow-blue Brigade, Fiorentina's Viola Club Viesseux, named after the piazza in Florence where they met (1971), the Naples Ultras (1972), Milan's Red and Black Brigade, Genoa's Griffin's Den and Turin's Granata Ultras (1973); the For Ever Ultras Bologna (1975), the Juventus Fighters (1975), Atalanta's Black and Blue Brigade (1976), the Eagle's Supporters Lazio and Rome's Commando Ultra Curva Sud, or 'CUCS' (literally the South Curve Ultras Command) (1977). Some broke away from existing clubs (the Boys were originally from Inter's Fossati Club, while the Granata Ultras split from Turin's Fedelissimi). Others arose from the fusion of smaller short-lived groups (the Juventus Fighters, for example, came from the former Panthers).

Some groups were based simply on a belonging to a certain urban area (the original core of the Sampdoria Ultras came from the Sestri Ponente quarter of Genoa), or peer group that met in Bars, schools or amusement arcades. Many of their members already belonged to political groups or movements, and it was precisely the characteristics of these politically extreme organisations, their sense of belonging and comradeship, their defiance of the powers that be and sense of conflict that gave substance to these groups, which were capable of rallying together hundreds of people in a matter of hours. Another aspect peculiar to the Ultras was their strong sense of territory. Indeed, the terraces were gradually abandoned by so-called "normal" supporters clubs, that moved their standards elsewhere to make room for the ultras' banners. The symbols brandished on these banners were for the most part wild animals (lions, panthers and tigers in particular), the inevitable Jolly Roger, weapons and similar symbols in a call to violence (the face of little Alex, in Kubrick's film "A Clockwork Orange"). At the outset, group activities were more often than not financed by collections, with everyone chipping-in and each member having a specific function, from organising transfers to follow their club, to buying skins for drums, poles for banners and cans of paint. With the advent of the Ultras, even the excesses of the public changed face completely. Unruly behaviour like invading the pitch (or 'referee-baiting) decreased, while from around 1974 onwards clashes between rival groups tended to become more frequent. This was the case in two matches that year: Turin-Sampdoria and Rome-Lazio. Right from the start spectators began throwing all sorts of objects onto the field, and violent battles between opposing factions of supporters ensued, obliging the police to intervene firing tear gas onto the terraces. The clashes continued onto the streets, almost in an urban warfare scenario: buses destroyed, cars overturned, etc. Many of these incidents arose from traditional rivalries (derbies between teams from the same city, or long-standing hates between rival cities, like Pisa vs. Livorno, Bergamo vs. Brescia or Palermo vs. Catania), while others depended on the political inclination of the respective supporters (the historic rivalry between Vicenza's left-wing Red Whites, and Verona's right wing Yellow-Blue Brigade).

Initially the violence was confined to a fairly limited area, meaning the stadium itself and its immediate vicinity. However, the first serious episodes were unfortunately soon to come (a stabbing during the Lazio-Naples match, the same scene being repeated during the 1975 Milan-Juventus match. In 1977 during the Atalanta - Turin match, ultras clashed with iron bars and the Inter-Milan match saw a knife fight between the Boys from Inter and Milan's Brigade). On the 28th of October 1979, during the Rome derby, a Lazio supporter, Vincenzo Paparelli, was hit in the head by a rocket fired from the south curve by a Rome Fedayn supporter, and died within a few minutes. The same Sunday saw other serious incidents in Ascoli ( Ascoli - Bologna, 7 injured), Milan (Inter - Milan, 18 injured) and Brescia (Brescia - Como, several injuries).

The Olympic stadium tragedy, aggravated by the widespread climate of violence that characterised many stadiums at the time, shook public opinion and became a major question both with the press and the authorities. Drastic steps were taken: banner poles, drums and even banners with warlike symbols were all banned from stadiums for several months. The 'eighties saw the gradual and inexorable expansion of ultra groups whose ranks came to number not tens, but hundreds and in some cases thousands of members. There was no team, whether in the North or South of Italy, first division or third, that wasn't supported by one or more organised youth fringe groups. This proliferation naturally led to the development of a complex network of alliances and rivalries. The more solid coalitions of this period included Rome - Atalanta - Juventus, Lazio - Bari - Turin, Inter - Fiorentina - Sampdoria, Milan - Genoa - Bologna, though it's curious to note how today these relations, once cordial, have for the most part deteriorated and been replaced by other alliances, at times being transformed into atrocious rivalry. 1982 went down in history for Italy's world cup victory in Spain. The final was against Germany in Madrid, in front of a crowd of 100,000 spectators, for the most part Italian. There were also a good number of ultra banners, but this proved to be the only real moment of national level aggregation. A practically unique case in Europe if you consider the characteristic cohesion of English, German or Dutch soccer fans following their national teams. The reasons for this irreparable division between Italian supporters, unable to unite even to support the national squad, are probably rooted in the age-old rivalry between a number of the country's oldest cities. Whatever the case, the ultras nevertheless presented themselves as a continental model, giving rise to a movement that was to touch the whole of Europe. The transfer became the fundamental moment in the life of an ultra, attended only by the most fanatical supporters with no fear of the potential dangers present. The transfer became a way of selecting the group and testing the strength of the bonds within it. Being present in one of the "hot" stadiums was an honour reserved for the few. Being there without a banner was considered an act of cowardice. The increase in the travelling public on transfer days also meant considerable efforts for the State Railways, which had to schedule "special trains" for supporters. The organised spectacle of the ultras involved entire terraces, thousands of people. Buying thousands of coloured balls or pom-poms was extremely costly, but the competition for the most original show was fierce. While the Sampdoria ultras set up a 90 by 32 metre flag, the ones from Rome handed out ten thousand red and yellow cards to the public; Turin supporters covered their stadium's Maratona curve with red and white bands of cloth, and the Naples ultras were famous for hurling thousands of rolls of toilet paper onto the pitch. Hand in hand with these notes of colour went increasingly black crime reports on the violent incidents happening in stadiums. The use of knives spread, especially in Milan and Rome, while the Atalanta ultras became famous for being very turbulent but prepared to use only fists and boots.

In February '84 the Coppa Italia match between Triestina and Udinese ended in serious clashes with the police; a young Trieste supporter, Stefan Furlan, was beaten into a coma by police batons and died the following day. Eight months later, at the end of the Milan - Cremonese match, Marco Fonghessi was stabbed to death. The killer, Giovanni Centrone, was barely of age. On the other hand, in the early 'eighties the link between ultras and politics began to weaken. The private cultural reaction pervading the younger ranks began to show even at the stadiums. Friendships between supporters of politically opposite inclination (Fiorentina-Verona) were further testimony to how the alliances between ultras were by then absolutely independent of any political factors. This period instead saw a steady increase in the use of drugs on the terraces. While the habitual drug addicts, frequent in the 'seventies, disappeared thanks to increasingly severe body searches, the numbers of cannabis smokers multiplied exponentially. Even the ultra's symbolism underwent a radical transformation and images of marijuana leaves made their appearance on scores of banners. When the Nuclei Sconvolti formed in Cosenza, their name (literally subvert nuclei) was an immediate success and many groups adopted it. So, by halfway through the 'eighties the Italian ultra movement was truly on the crest of the wave. The groups all had a multitude of followers (for example, for the 1987-88 season Milan's Fossa dei Leoni was over 15,000 strong), with a clearly defined hierarchical structure. Some groups, like the Naples Commando Ultra Curva B even had a highly evolved management structure (members filed in a database, a group house organ, a TV, etc...)..

In the 'nineties the ultras world was overwhelmed by profound changes and began to develop an identity crisis. Many of the fundamental values that 'being ultra' had been based on in the past began to be felt in a different way, and far less by the incoming generations, probably because being ultra had come to be a fashion. But there was another side to the coin, that of an ultras movement which, though still unable to reach total unity of intent as a result of certain inviolable hatreds, became aware of the need to react to survive. After thirty years of history the ultras had become an integral part of the football system, irreplaceable and influential, and a determining factor even in club strategy. The second half of the 'nineties was fatally marred by the killing of the Genoa supporter Vincenzo Spagnolo in January 1995. This devastating episode threatened the very existence of the ultras movement, already in profound crisis due to the changing generation and the dividing up of the terraces into lots of tiny "slices", something that was made more noticeable by the disorder brought to the stadiums by the so-called "wild dogs" or scattered supporters, and due to an identity crisis which was aggravated by the disbanding of certain groups of ultras that until then had been a point of reference for many supporters, leaving them with a sense of loss and disorientation. From the ultras rally in Genoa, for which the football championships traditionally stop, came a raw-boned and crude statement inspired by the Bergamo ultras and their coarse conservative mentality, entitled "basta lame basta infami" - cut out the knives, cut out the infamy.